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A Summary of the Conference
On Consumer Transactions and Credit
I
n March of this year, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia and the Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania,
in association with the Journal of Financial Interme-
diation, sponsored a conference on research issues
involving consumer transactions and credit. This
article offers a summary of the papers presented at
the conference.
Consumers today have more
financial options for saving, borrowing,
spending, and investing than ever
before. Yet little is known about
consumers￿ decisions about how much
to save, which types of assets to invest in,
how much to borrow, which types of
debt to incur, and which instruments to
use to make payments. Similarly, little is
known about how firms price the
financial instruments consumers choose
to use. This intellectual neglect of
consumer finance, and especially
consumer credit, is somewhat surprising,
given that debt owed by households
represents over 25 percent of total
credit-market debt outstanding and that
the outstanding volume of consumer
credit, including mortgages, exceeds the
volume of  U.S. government debt.
To begin to address these issues
and to encourage more research in the
field of consumer finance, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and the
Wharton Financial Institutions Center,
in association with the Journal of
Financial Intermediation, sponsored a
one-day conference at the Philadelphia
Reserve Bank on March 23. Five
research papers and two addresses were
presented to an international group of
economists, who discussed consumer
credit and transaction behavior. *
In his opening address to
conference participants, Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia President An-
thony M. Santomero suggested that the
lack of research on consumer financial
behavior in part  ￿reflects the relative
simplicity of most U.S. household
portfolios before the 1990s. But an
explosive period of financial innovation
in the last two decades and the rapid
growth in consumers￿ wealth in the
1990s have introduced many more
households to many more financial
options.￿
President Santomero said more
research is needed. ￿This conference is
just the first of many efforts that we at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-
phia plan to make to advance the
consumer credit research agenda,￿ he
said. ￿We hope to shed light on the state
of research and to spotlight areas of
potential future contributions.￿
As he noted, the Philadelphia
Fed has a particular interest in the area,
since some 40 percent of consumer
credit card activity emanates from
Delaware banks in the Third Federal
Reserve District. To underscore this
interest, the Bank has established a
Payment Cards Center that will serve as
a focal point for investigating issues
central to this dynamic sector of the
financial services industry.  The
conference, proceedings of which are
summarized below, represents an
important first step in that direction.
CONSUMER RESPONSE TO
CHANGES IN CREDIT SUPPLY
The credit card market
remains a relatively understudied area
of consumer finance. Nicholas S.
Souleles, of the Wharton School,
presented some interesting findings on
the behavior of credit card borrowers,
concluding that liquidity matters. His
paper, ￿Consumer Response to Changes
in Credit Supply: Evidence from Credit
Card Data,￿ co-authored by David B.
Gross, formerly of the Graduate School
of Business, University of Chicago, is
based on analysis of a unique data set of
several thousand individual credit card
accounts followed monthly for 24 to 36
months. Souleles reported that accord-
ing to their empirical work, ￿increases in
credit limits for credit card borrowers
generate immediate and significant
increases in debt,￿ especially for people
who are already close to their limit. This
* The papers are available on our web site at
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suggests that these credit limits are a
binding liquidity constraint. However,
even people who have not borrowed
enough on their credit cards to be near
their limits start borrowing more when
credit card issuers increase their credit
limits.
This finding is consistent with
theories about precautionary savings.
Consumers worry not only about credit
constraints that are already binding but
about the possibility that they will face a
binding constraint in the future and will
not be able to borrow and consume as
much as they would like.  Consumers
want to keep some cash on hand,
including some of their available credit,
to act as a buffer against unexpected
emergencies. But when their credit
limits rise, only part of the increase is
reserved for the buffer; it is optimal for
them to consume some of the increase.
Souleles indicated that some of
their other results, however, are not
consistent with current theories of
consumer savings behavior. For example,
many of the people who are borrowing
on their credit cards hold relatively large
balances in their low-interest checking
and savings accounts. Gross and
Souleles found that ￿one-third of
borrowers have over one month￿s worth
of income in liquid assets, which is more
than typically needed for cash transac-
tions.￿  These funds could be used to
pay off high-interest credit card debt
without sacrificing much interest
income.
Another interesting result is
that in contrast to most other studies,
their research also indicates that
consumers￿ credit card debt is particu-
larly sensitive to changes in credit card
interest rates, especially to large declines
in rates.  This might explain the
widespread use of teaser rates.  The
discussant, Paul S. Calem, of the
Federal Reserve Board, suggested that
further analysis of the effect of teaser
rates on credit card borrowing would be
an interesting avenue for future
research. Souleles said their analysis also
showed that consumers seem to respond
to a reduction in a credit card rate by
switching balances from other cards to
the low-rate card. So consumers appear
to be sensitive enough to interest rate
changes to overcome the costs associ-
ated with switching balances from one
card to another. Such switching costs
were the subject of another paper
presented at the conference.
ESTIMATING
SWITCHING COSTS
One of the factors often
pointed to in explaining why credit card
interest rates are relatively sticky and
generally only somewhat responsive to
changes in market interest rates is that
there appear to be large costs associated
with switching accounts. But these
switching costs have been difficult to
quantify. In ￿Estimating Switching Costs
and Oligopolistic Behavior,￿ Moshe Kim
and Doron Kliger, both of the University
of Haifa, and Bent Vale of the Central
Bank of Norway, present a method for
estimating switching costs for bank
customers. Their research is based on
aggregate data, since customer-specific
information is typically not available.
In his presentation, Kim
discussed the theoretical literature on
switching costs, which indicates how
such costs can influence firms￿ pricing
behavior. But because micro-level data
on individual transactions are nearly
impossible to come by, researchers have
had difficulty in estimating the magni-
In contrast to most other studies, [Gross and
Souleles￿] research also indicates that con-
sumers￿ credit card debt is particularly sensi-
tive to changes in credit card interest rates,
especially to large declines in rates.
tude and significance of switching costs.
In their paper, the authors develop an
empirical model that is able to quantify
the importance of switching costs as well
as customers￿ probabilities of switching
from one firm to another, even when
customer-specific data are absent.
The model, which was
estimated using aggregate data on banks
that operated in Norway from 1988 to
1996, focused on the market for bank
loans. Bank lending is a good candidate
for study, since long-term relationships
and repeated contacts among banks and
their customers ￿ factors that charac-
terize bank lending ￿ may be a source
of switching costs.
The study￿s empirical results
confirm the importance of switching
costs in bank lending, with the esti-
mated magnitude of switching costs
differing across various subsamples of the
banks. For the entire sample, switching
costs average 4.1 percent, which is about
one-third of the market average interest
rate on loans. But switching costs are
found to decrease with bank size, down
to 2.1 percent for banks with 60 or more
branches. This decrease in the size of
switching costs may occur because the
customers of large banks tend to be large
companies. These firms are often
publicly traded and enjoy greater
market mobility than small retail
customers. Consistent with this result is
the finding that in the sample, custom-
ers￿ relationships with their banks ranged
between 16.7 years at small banks down
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co-authors also find that the customer
lock-in generated by the switching costs
is valuable to banks: locked-in custom-
ers add nearly 25 percent to banks￿
value.
The discussant, Steven A.
Sharpe, of the Federal Reserve Board,
suggested that the authors try to
measure the loan price-cost margin more
precisely, since it is a crucial variable in
their model. In particular, Sharpe was
concerned that the measure used could
reflect differences in loan risk, which
could differ by bank size, as well as
differences in market power, and that
the imprecise measurement of the price-





Another paper at the confer-
ence also examined banks￿ loan pricing
behavior. In ￿Bank Consolidation and
Consumer Loan Rates,￿ Charles Kahn
and George Pennacchi, of the Univer-
sity of Illinois, and Ben Sopranzetti of
Rutgers University, examine whether
banks change their pricing of consumer
loans after bank mergers and whether
the pricing behavior differs for different
types of consumer loans.
The recent wave of mergers in
the banking industry has spurred a
number of researchers to examine the
impact of mergers on potentially
vulnerable bank customers. But as
Sopranzetti explained, to date, most
studies have focused on the supply and
pricing of small-business loans and
consumer deposits.  In their paper, the
authors shed new light on the effect of
bank consolidation on the pricing of
auto loans and unsecured personal
loans.
In particular, while rates on
personal loans tend to rise at banks in
the market following a bank merger,
rates on automobile loans tend to fall.
The authors attribute this difference to
the scale economies that exist in the
auto loan market and the fact that there
is strong competition from nonbank
lenders for auto loans; hence, the
merger does not represent an increase in
banks￿ market power in the auto loan
market. Thus, consumers in the market
for new auto loans are likely to benefit
from a merger, since prices fall, while
those seeking unsecured personal loans
are not likely to see better pricing
options.
Sopranzetti reported on other
findings of their analysis: (1) Leader-
follower pricing behavior is more
widespread in automobile loan markets
than in personal loan markets. In other
words, if one bank changes its auto loan
rate, other banks are likely to follow it by
changing their rates. This is consistent
with the greater competition found in
auto loan markets. The authors suggest
that higher consumer switching costs in
the personal loan market might make
the personal loan rate set by a given
bank less responsive to its competitors￿
rates. (2) Personal loan rates are stickier
than automobile loan rates, in the same
are slower to lower consumer loan rates
when warranted by declines in other
market rates than they are to raise
consumer loan rates when other market
rates rise.
The discussant, Leonard I.
Nakamura, of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia, indicated that personal
loans are much more heterogeneous
across banks than are auto loans and
that this might be influencing the
results. He also suggested that having a
theory about how banks￿ pricing
behavior would change after a merger
would be helpful in interpreting the
results. Conference participants
suggested that a more complete
consideration of market competition
would be a useful extension. For
example, how do the special characteris-
tics of auto finance subsidiaries affect
the bank market for auto loans? How
does unsecured credit card debt come
into play in understanding the market
for personal bank loans?
PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY
AND THE LEVEL OF ENTREPRE-
NEURIAL ACTIVITY
Another area relevant to the
study of consumer finance is the issue of
bankruptcy.  In ￿Personal Bankruptcy
and the Level of Entrepreneurial
Activity,￿ Wei Fan of the University of
Michigan and Michelle J. White of the
University of California San Diego
examine the effect of the provisions in
bankruptcy law on entrepreneurial
activity. Their paper is fitting for a
conference on consumer finance, since,
in many cases, it is very difficult to
disentangle a small business￿s finances
from that of the owner￿s.
Small businesses, as well as
consumers, can file for bankruptcy
under Chapter 7 of the federal bank-
ruptcy code. Debts of noncorporate
firms are considered personal liabilities of
the entrepreneur/owner in the event of
a business failure. The law requires that
the entrepreneur give up assets above a
While rates on per-
sonal loans tend to
rise at banks in the
market following a
bank merger, rates on
automobile loans tend
to fall.
way that consumer deposit rates tend to
be sticky, that is, not very responsive to
changes in the overall level of market
interest rates.  And, consistent with
empirical research on consumer deposits,
personal loan rates are more rigid in
more concentrated markets. (3) Both
automobile and personal loan rates tend
to respond asymmetrically to increases
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fixed bankruptcy exemption level for
repayment to creditors, but all their
future earnings are exempt from the
obligation to repay.  This ￿fresh start￿
provision lowers the ultimate risk of
starting a business, since more of the
entrepreneur￿s assets will be protected in
the event the business fails. So the
exemption provides a form of ￿wealth
insurance￿ to the business owner, and
higher exemption levels could poten-
tially encourage the formation of more
new businesses. The fact that the
exemption levels are set by states and
vary widely, especially the exemption for
the debtor￿s house (the homestead
exemption), provides a natural labora-
tory for studying whether bankruptcy
exemptions have a significant economic
effect on entrepreneurship.
The authors find empirical
support for the idea that the bankruptcy
system is a factor in a worker￿s decision
to be self-employed rather than to work
for others. Fan and White find: (1) The
probability that families that own homes
are self-employed is 35 percent higher if
families live in states with unlimited
homestead exemptions rather than low
exemptions. (2) Families that are
homeowners are 22 percent more likely
to start businesses if they live in states
with higher or unlimited, rather than
low, homestead exemptions. And they
are more likely to organize their
businesses as noncorporate rather than
corporate.  (3) One possible negative
effect of higher exemptions is that they
may encourage more bankruptcy filings,
but the authors do not find that
entrepreneurs are more likely to
terminate businesses if they live in states
with unlimited rather than low home-
stead exemptions.
In her presentation, White
commented on the proposed new
federal bankruptcy legislation and
possible implications based on this
research.  The proposed legislation
focuses on reducing abuses by relatively
well-off individual debtors. However,
Fan and White￿s research suggests an
unintended consequence of adopting
these reforms could be a reduction in
the level of self-employment by U.S.
households.
The discussant, Mitchell
Berlin, of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, generally applauded the
paper for extending what is generally
considered a consumer issue to the
environment of small business and
entrepreneurship. At the same time, he
also made the point that while high
exemptions may support small-business
formation, they may just as likely reduce
the supply of credit to borrowers, which
would mitigate any positive effect on
small-business formation. In addition, he
pointed out that it was still an open
question whether self-employment
necessarily means more economic
growth or whether it reflects employ-
ment redistributed from larger firms.
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF TRANSACTIONS PRIVACY
Another issue that￿s become
increasingly important to consumers is
whether the privacy of their transactions
is being protected. Rapid advances in
information technology have dramati-
cally lowered the cost and increased the
speed of record keeping and transmis-
sion of information.  The Internet has
not only affected the cost of transmit-
ting information but also broadened the
nature of potentially available informa-
tion, including information stored on
personal computers. All of these factors
have led to undeniable increases in
convenience and welfare to consumers,
but they have also fueled the public
debate on privacy, particularly Internet
privacy.
In their paper, ￿A Theory of
Transactions Privacy,￿ Charles M. Kahn,
of the University of Illinois, James
McAndrews, of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, and William
Roberds, of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta, develop a model to examine
the tradeoffs between the costs and
benefits of transactions privacy. In their
model, privacy means the concealment
of potentially useful information, but
concealment also potentially bestows
benefits. As long as contracting is
flexible and the initial rights to the
information are clearly assigned, Coase￿s
theorem would suggest that privacy laws
would not be necessary. Once property
rights are initially assigned to a party
(either one), the parties will bargain,
making appropriate side payments to
one another, so that the outcome chosen
regarding whether to reveal or conceal
information will be the one that has the
largest total benefit to both parties. (The
initial assignment of rights will affect the
distribution of those benefits.)
However, the authors argue
that there are good reasons to believe
that the assumptions of Coase￿s theorem
wouldn￿t apply in our current transac-
tions environment. For example, it is
difficult to commit to not using informa-
tion once it becomes known, and
currently, neither the law nor technol-
ogy clearly assigns rights to transactions
information. The authors show that in
the current environment, the initial
assignment of rights over private
information could have economic
consequences.
As McAndrews pointed out in
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action information provide incentives for
parties to develop technologies to control
information. This could result in a race
to create technologies to conceal
information (for example, anonymous
electronic money) or to reveal informa-
tion (for example, Internet ￿cookies￿).
Clearly defining rights to transaction
information would forestall wasteful
investments in technology to control
information.
William L. Lang, of the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency,
complimented the authors on develop-
ing a formal model with which to
address the privacy issue. He did
question whether the model was rich
enough for policy analysis. For example,
in the model, parties are assumed to be
aware of when transaction information
is disclosed and what information is
disclosed. However, in many cases,
people do not know that information has
been disclosed. While the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act requires financial
institutions to disclose information
sharing, nonfinancial firms are not
required to do so. Lang also thought that





Toulouse University, France, presented
the conference￿s keynote luncheon
address, ￿Payment Systems Competi-
tion.￿ Rochet￿s talk was based on his
ongoing research on payment systems,
which he is carrying out with his
colleague Jean Tirole. His remarks
focused on their  research-in-progress on
competition between different types of
payment systems: those structured as
open associations of banks, like Visa and
MasterCard, and those structured as
closed systems, like American Express
and Discover. An important and still
unanswered question is whether such
competition will lead to more efficient
usage of payment cards. The Rochet-
Tirole model is an important contribu-
tion to the study of payment systems,
and it is applicable to other environ-
ments, such as competition between
interbank large-value payment systems
like CHIPS and Fedwire, or competition
between credit cards and debit cards.
SUMMARY
The research on payment
systems by Rochet and Tirole, along
with the other work presented and
discussed at the conference, represents
an important step in meeting the
challenge posed by President Santomero
in his opening address to the confer-
ence. In discussing the current state of
the literature, President Santomero
emphasized that ￿we need to develop
new theories if we hope to explain the
economic rationale for and the impact
of various transactions media, like credit
cards, debit cards, and smart cards,
which are much more complicated than
our traditional characterization of
money.￿ We hope that this conference
and the work of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia￿s Payment Cards
Center will inspire other researchers to
join in this effort. B R